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Consumer contracts and the Internet in EU private international 
law 
 
Zheng Sophia Tang 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internet has great potential when it is used in the commercial field. It is an 
effective low-cost instrument that could enable small and medium sized businesses to 
access foreign markets without extra cost. It also empowers consumers who can select 
from many suppliers and compare the quality, services, and prices to make the best 
choice.1 The Internet has the potential to build a truly global borderless market. In the 
EU, the internal market could benefit from the Internet which could remove internal 
frontiers, eliminate physical and cost barriers and facilitate free movement of goods, 
free movement of services, and freedom of establishment.2 On the other hand, the 
opportunities are associated with commercial risk. Where disputes have arisen, the 
parties would wonder which country they might sue or be sued in and which country’s 
substantive law should apply to decide their rights and obligations. Without clear and 
well-designed jurisdiction and choice of law rules, uncertainty would hamper the 
development of consumer-oriented e-commerce. 
 Proper private international law, which is compatible with the special 
characteristics of the Internet and appropriate to balance the conflict of interest 
between consumers and e-businesses, thus becomes necessary and important. 
Traditionally, private international law functions to allocate a particular contractual 
relationship within the territory of a country based either on the party’s intention or on 
the objective connecting factors.3 Although the Internet has brought challenges to the 
traditional connecting factors in contracts,4 it does not lead to the necessity for any 
fundamental reform except the need for special construction and interpretation in the 
context of the Internet.5 The doctrine of party autonomy basically could stand intact 
from the challenge of the Internet.6  Electronic commerce may only challenge the 
formal requirements of a choice of court or choice of law agreement, but once this 
                                                 
1 Many e-compare websites are established to provide the best choice for the consumers. For example, 
the travel and hotel comparison website, www.travelsupermarket.com; the website comparing 
electronic products, www.kelkoo.co.uk; the product comparison site, www.pricerunner.co.uk. 
2 Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market, [2000] OJ L178/1, Recital 1. 
3  See in general, Fawcett J. and J.M. Carruthers (2008), Cheshire, North and Fawcett: Private 
International Law, 14th edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 20–37; Hartley, T.C. (2009), 
International Commercial Litigation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 15–16, 566–97; 
Von Mehren A.T. (2002), ‘Theory and practice of adjudicatory authority in private international law’, 
in Collected Courses, Vol. 295, The Hague, Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Blom, J. 
(1978, 1979, 1980) ‘Choice of Law Methods in the Private International Law of Contract’ 16 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 230; 17 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 206; 18 Canadian 
Yearbook of International Law 161; Clarkson, C.M.V. and J. Hill (2011), The Conflict of Laws, 4th 
edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 7–9, 33. 
4 Such as the interpretation of the place where an e-contract is concluded, the place of delivery of a 
digital product online, and the place where online services are provided. 
5 Fawcett J.J., Harris, J. and M. Bridge (2005), International Sale of Goods, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, paras 10.242–10.258; Hill, J. (2008), Cross-Border Consumer Contracts, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 149–50; Z.S. Tang (2009), Electronic Consumer Contracts in the Conflict of 
Laws, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 17–18. 
6 Tang, supra n. 5, p. 18. 
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agreement is proved to be validly concluded, jurisdiction and applicable law are easy 
to determine.7 Unfortunately, both doctrines have limited application in consumer 
contracts. In the EU, the legislators want to protect consumers as the weaker party in 
international transactions and provide protective jurisdiction and choice of law rules 
in consumer contracts. 8  The protective conflict rules depart from the traditional 
technical culture of private international law and introduce consideration to protecting 
rights of consumers.9 The Internet challenges the proper functioning of EU private 
international law in cross-border consumer contracts. The private international law 
challenge increases commercial risk and uncertainty and reduces the confidence of 
both consumers and businesses in e-commerce. In order to promote e-commerce, 
legislators have worked to reform traditional private international law to provide 
certainty and predictability and to reduce unnecessary legal barriers to consumer 
contracts on the Internet. 10  The European legislators responded to the request to 
reconsider consumer conflict of laws in e-commerce during the late 1990s when the 
Brussels Convention was converted into the Brussels I Regulation.11 A similar reform 
was adopted again when the Rome Convention was converted into the Rome I 
Regulation by the end of 2000s. 12  Section II briefly introduces the historic 
development of European consumer private international law and the reform by 
taking account of the Internet’s influence. 
 Not all consumers will be protected in conflict of laws. The protective rules 
will only apply to certain consumer contracts. Section III generally explains the scope 
of protection taking aboard the special characteristics and special consumer contracts 
in e-commerce. The protective conflicts rules are generally based on the principle of 
‘targeting’, that is, if the e-business, by adopting the Internet in its marketing and 
selling strategy, targets the consumer’s domicile or habitual residence, the e-business 
should be subject to the jurisdiction and domestic law of the consumer’s home,13 and 
                                                 
7 As to the formal validity in e-commerce, see UK Law Commission, ‘Electronic Commerce: Formal 
Requirements in Commercial Transactions’, Dec 2001; Tang, supra n. 5, pp. 123–30. It is common 
understanding now that agreements concluded through electronic means should not be denied their 
validity. See Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels I Regulation), art. 23(2); UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Electronic Commerce 1996, art. 8(1) and 8(3)(a).  
8 Arts 15–17, Brussels I Regulation; art. 6, Regulation 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations (Rome I Regulation). The same targeting test was adopted in the old version, Arts 13–15, 
Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels 
Convention) and art. 5, Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome 
Convention). 
9 Gillies, L. (2003), ‘Adapting international private law rules for electronic consumer contracts’ in 
Richett, C. and T. Telfer (ed.), International Perspectives on Consumers’ Access to Justice, Cambridge 
University Press, p. 359; Hartley, T. (1982), ‘Consumer Protection Provisions in the EEC Convention’ 
in North, P. (ed), Contract Conflicts, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, p. 111; Tang, supra n. 5, 
pp. 4–8. 
10 Tang, supra n. 5, 7. 
11  European Council, ‘Council Working Party on the Revision of the Brussels and Lugano 
Conventions’, JUSTCIV 60. For more details, see Beaumont, P. (2002), ‘The Brussels Convention 
becomes a regulation’ in Fawcett, J. (2002), Reform and Development of Private International Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 9; Kennett, W. (2001), ‘The Brussels I Regulation’, ICLQ 725; J. 
Harris, J. (2001), ‘The Brussels Regulation’, Civil Justice Quarterly 218; Crawford, E.B. and J.M. 
Carruthers (2006), International Private Law: A Scots Perspective, 2nd edn., Edinburgh: W. Green, pp. 
429–32. 
12 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on the Conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the 
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations into a Community Instrument and its Modernisation’ 
COM(2002) 654 final. 
13 Art. 15,Brussels I Regulation; art. 6(1) Rome I Regulation. 
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the application of the traditional private international law doctrine of party autonomy 
is limited.14 The concept of ‘targeting’, however, is particularly troublesome on the 
Internet. It is widely known that the Internet is a powerful instrument that has almost 
unlimited and international reach. Once a website is established, it is accessible 
almost everywhere in the world.15 A broad interpretation of ‘targeting’ based purely 
on accessibility would bring high risks to e-businesses. Although modern technology 
provides the possibility of limiting the reach and accessibility of a website and some 
contents, the extra expense of such technology would increase cost and may 
discourage small and medium-sized companies from engaging in e-commerce. A 
narrow interpretation of ‘targeting’, on the other hand, may be unfair to consumers, 
who may be required to bring an action in a foreign country or may have to construe 
their rights and obligations under the law of another country – something not 
necessarily expected or even noticed by the consumer, as a layman, before completing 
the transaction. The European legislators have faced a difficult task in balancing the 
conflicting interest between consumers and e-businesses, especially small and 
medium sized companies.16 The interpretation of ‘targeting’ is discussed in Section IV. 
 While some commentators continue to criticize European protective conflict 
of laws in e-consumer contracts and try to provide alternatives to suit the development 
of consumer-oriented e-commerce, other commentators realize that the protective 
conflict of laws is used very infrequently in practice. They consider it a matter of fact 
that most e-consumer contracts are of small value which makes litigation, either in 
consumers’ home state or in a foreign country, unreasonable. As a result, the worry 
about the negative effects of protective private international law in the e-commerce 
practice is not realistic.17 Consumers’ better access to justice on the Internet should be 
provided by alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods, or by collective redress. 
This view is shared by the European legislators. The European Commission has 
considered issues much broader than purely private international law in cross-border 
individual litigation, including out-of-court dispute resolution and collective redress. 
The ECC-Net, a Europe-wide network of the 29 European Consumer Centres in all 
EU countries, Norway and Iceland, for example, helps consumers and businesses to 
resolve cross-border disputes.18 The EU also adopted a consumer ADR Directive19 
and a consumer Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Regulation in June 2013.20 In 2013, 
the European Commission published the recommendation on common principles for 
                                                 
14 Art. 17, Brussels I Regulation; art. 6(2), Rome I Regulation. 
15 Svantesson, D.J.B. (2007), Private International Law and the Internet, The Hague/London/Boston: 
Kluwer Law International, ch 2; Puurunen, T. (2002), ‘The judicial jurisdiction of States over 
international business-to-consumer electronic commerce from the perspective of legal certainty’ 8 UC 
Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 133; Burnstein, M. (2001), ‘A global network in a 
compartmentalised legal environment’, in Boele-Woelki, K. and C. Kessedjian (eds), Internet: Which 
Court Decides? Which Law Applies?, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, p. 32. 
16 Economic and Social Committee, ‘Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal 
for a Council Regulation (EC) on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters’ [2000] OJ C117/6, para. 4.2.2. 
17 Hill, supra n.5, p. 2. 
18 For more on the ECC-Net, see http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ecc/index_en.htm, accessed 15 April 
2014. 
19 Directive 2013/11/EU on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, [2013] OJ L165/63. 
20 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 on Online Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR), [2003] OJ 
L165/1. 
 4 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States. 21  It is believed that the 
combination of different dispute resolution methods would effectively improve 
consumers’ access to justice in the cross-border context. Section V finally considers 
the development of the multiple dispute resolution scheme in Europe and the 
application of private international law in ADR/ODR and collective action. Section 
VI concludes that the European consumer private international law is generally 
appropriate in cross-border individual consumer litigation and it does not cause 
barriers to the development of e-commerce. It, however, needs to be developed 
further in order to cope with other dispute resolution methods, which may prove more 
effective in resolving consumers’ cross-border access to justice. 
 
II. EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONSUMER 
CONTRACTS 
 
One special characteristic of EU private international law is that the EU has taken a 
pioneering role in introducing protective jurisdiction and choice of law rules to 
consumer contracts, with the special purpose of protecting consumers versus 
businesses. The protective private international law was first introduced in the area of 
jurisdiction in the Brussels Convention of 1968,22 which only covers instalment sales 
and loans.23 The protection was later extended to more consumer contracts24 and was 
equally adopted in the choice of law rules in the Rome Convention of 1980.25 The 
Brussels Convention provides that consumers are entitled to sue and be sued in their 
domicile 26  as far as the contract was preceded by a specific invitation or by 
advertising and the consumer took all the necessary steps to conclude the contract in 
that state.27 The choice of court agreement in such contracts will only be enforceable 
if it is entered into after the dispute has arisen, provides consumers with additional 
forum/fora to bring the action, or designates the common domicile of both parties at 
the time of contracting.28 The Rome Convention provides that in contracts satisfying 
the same conditions,29 the parties’ choice of law cannot deprive consumers of the 
protection of the mandatory rules of the law of the consumer’s habitual residence.30 In 
the absence of choice, the law of the consumer’s habitual residence shall apply as the 
default applicable law.31 
 Both provisions were established long before the Internet was widely adopted 
in business activities. There is no doubt that the traditional provision has not taken 
into consideration distance-selling methods, especially the use of Internet in pursuing 
                                                 
21 European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation on Common Principles for Injunctive and 
Compensatory Collective Redress Mechanisms in the Member States Concerning Violations of Rights 
Granted under Union Law’, C(2013) 3539/3. 
22 Convention of 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Brussels Convention), [1972] OJ L299/32, arts 13–15. 
23 P. Jenard, P. (1979), ‘Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters’ (‘Jenard Report’) [1979] OJ C59/1, 33. 
24 The Convention on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, [1978] OJ L304/77, arts 13–15.  
25 Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations, [1980] OJ L 266/1, art. 5(1). 
26 Art 14. 
27 Art. 13(3). 
28 Art. 15. 
29 Art. 5. 
30 Art. 5(2). 
31 Art. 5(3). 
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commercial activities. After the Internet was developed in the 1990s, commentators 
started to criticize the likely negative effect of the existing private international 
rules.32 The most common criticism lies in two areas: first, this provision excludes 
‘mobile’ consumers from being protected even though the business purposely targets 
the consumer’s domicile and could reasonably expect to be subject to the jurisdiction 
of that country;33 second, it requires a ‘special invitation’ or ‘advertising’ to be made 
in the consumer’s domicile, and it is hard to construe whether such requirements are 
met on the Internet, where the traditional methods of invitation and advertising are no 
longer in use.34 
 The protective jurisdiction was subject to reform during the process of 
converting the Brussels Convention into the Brussels I Regulation. The European 
Commission has proposed to change the condition into a more flexible and Internet-
compatible one. The new arrangement states that the protective conflicts rules are 
applicable if: 
‘the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial or 
professional activities in the Member State of the consumer's domicile or, by any 
means, directs such activities to that Member State or to several States including 
that Member State, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.’35 
 
This change was adopted in the final version of the Brussels I Regulation. This 
provision has caused concerns mainly from e-businesses who worry that the 
globalizing nature of the Internet may subject e-businesses to potential actions in 
every Member State unless sufficient methods are employed to ring-fence the 
market. 36  Questions and concerns continue to arise in terms of the appropriate 
interpretation of the term ‘pursue in’ and ‘direct to’ on the Internet. Although it has 
been repeatedly confirmed by the European Commission as well as commentators that 
the simple ‘accessibility’ of a website in a Member State is insufficient to trigger the 
protective conflict of laws, without official clarification and uniform interpretation of 
these terms, uncertainty continues to exist amongst e-commerce participants which 
continues to hamper potential active e-commerce players from being fully engaged in 
commercial activities. This issue will be discussed in detail in Section IV below.  
 Regardless of all the questions, when the Rome Convention became the Rome 
I Regulation, the same reform was adopted. It is also noted that the Brussels I 
Regulation has undergone a reform and will be replaced by the Brussels I Recast from 
10 January 2015.37 The protective jurisdiction rules on consumer contracts were not, 
in that instrument, subject to reform, which shows that, irrespective of academic 
                                                 
32  See van der Hof, S. (2003), ‘European conflict rules concerning international online consumer 
contracts’ 12 Information & Communication Technology Law 165; Foss M and L Bygrave (2000), 
‘International consumer purchases through the internet: Jurisdictional issues pursuant to European law’ 
8 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 99; Puurunen, T. (2002), ‘The judicial 
jurisdiction of states over international business-to-consumer electronic commerce from the perspective 
of legal certainty’ 8 UC Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 133; Riefa, C. (2004) ‘Article 5 
of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations of 19 june 1980 and consumer 
e-contracts: The need for reform’ 13(1) Information and Communications Technology Law 59. 
33 Economic and Social Committee Opinion, para 4.2.4. 
34  Foss and Bygrave, supra n. 32, 124; Debussere, F. (2002), ‘International jurisdiction over e-
consumer contracts’ 10 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 344, 355. 
35 Art. 15(1)(c) Brussels I Regulation; art. 6(1) Rome I Regulation. 
36 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, [1999] OJ C 376E/1, art 15. 
37 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast), [2012] OJEU L351/1. 
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concerns, the legal reality does not demonstrate as great a difficulty and challenge as 
has been presumed. The legislator, as a result, does not see the necessity to further 
reform the current protective conflict of laws in consumer contracts. 
 
III. SCOPE OF PROTECTION 
 
European private international law provides pioneering rules for consumer protection, 
but it does not protect consumers per se. There is a strict limitation as to who should 
be protected. The scope of protection depends on: (1) the identity of the parties; (2) 
the type of contracts; (3) in terms of jurisdiction, the defendant being domiciled or 
deemed to be domiciled in the EU; (4) the expectation of the parties. 
 
A. Identity of the Parties 
 
Needless to say, the protection applies to a contract where one party must be a 
‘consumer’. A consumer is defined as a natural person who has concluded a contract 
for the purpose ‘outside his trade or profession’.38 The line between consumers and 
non-consumers, however, is ambiguous. In the existing ten CJEU decisions 
concerning the application of art. 15 of the Brussels I Regulation (art. 13 of the 
Brussels Convention), four relate to whether the claimant is qualified as a 
‘consumer’. 39  This is mainly because the concept ‘purpose outside trade or 
profession’ is unclear. Some professions are unconventional. For example, some 
individuals are part-time investors, who purchase to acquire profits instead of 
consumption.40 It is also uncertain whether the protective rules should only apply if 
the other party, the business, could reasonably expect that it is trading with a 
consumer. It is particularly hard for a business to predict the purpose of a purchase in 
online trading due to the fact that most such trading involves low-value transactions 
that may attract both consumers and business buyers. The application of protective 
conflict of laws does not depend on whether the identity of the buyer should be 
disclosed and appreciated by the seller at the time of contracting. Inasmuch as the 
buyer is a consumer, the protective rules shall apply. This has imposed uncertainty on 
online traders. 
 
B. Type of Contracts 
 
Not all contracts fall within the scope of consumer protection. Neither the protective 
jurisdiction nor choice of law rules apply to transport contracts.41  This is mainly 
because most cross-border transport contracts, especially carriage by air, are 
international in nature and international conventions exist as to the substantive rights 
                                                 
38 Art 15(1) Brussels I Regualtion; art 6(1) Rome I Regulation. 
39 Case C-89/91, Shearson Lehmann Hutton v TVB Treuhandgesellschaft fur Vermogensverwaltung 
und Beteiligungen [1993] ECR I-139; Case C-269/95, Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl [1997] 
ECR I-3767; Case C-99/96, Hans-Hermann Mietz v Intership Yachting Sneek BV [1999] ECR I-2277; 
Case C-464/1, Gruber v Bay Wa AG [2005] ECR I-439. 
40 Standard Bank London v Apostolakis [2002] CLC 933. See discussion in Hess, B., Pfeiffer, T. and P. 
Schlosser, ‘Report on the Application of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States’, Study 
JLS/C4/2005/03. 
41 Art. 15(3) Brussels I Regulation; art. 6(4)(b) Rome I Regulation. 
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and obligations, procedure and conflict of laws arising out of these contracts.42 It is 
believed that applying protective conflicts rules in transport contracts may conflict 
with the existing international conventions and cause difficulties. 43  However, 
although transport contracts are excluded from consumer protection, they are 
nevertheless covered in the general European conflict of laws. Special jurisdiction in 
art. 5(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, for example, applies to carriage by air claims 
between businesses and consumers fallen outwith the Montreal Convention but falling 
under the EU Denied Boarding Directive,44  and art. 5 of the Rome I Regulation 
provides separate choice of law rules for carriage contracts. A large number of cross-
border consumer contracts concluded online are transport contracts. Most transport 
operators and airlines have maintained websites and have reserved some competitive 
fares to website purchase only. It is disadvantageous to most e-consumers that 
protective private international law does not apply to transport contracts. 
 Besides, the Rome I Regulation also excludes from the scope of protection 
services contracts where services are provided exclusively in a country other than the 
consumer’s habitual residence. 45  As a result, if a consumer booked a hotel 
accommodation or a holiday in another country, the law of his habitual residence no 
longer protects the consumer. Instead, the law of the place where services are 
provided should systematically apply. This is mainly because requiring a hotel or a 
restaurant to comply with different customers’ domestic laws is unrealistic. Given the 
international nature of hotel services, it is detrimental to require hotel operators to 
ring-fence the market to one particular country. 
 Although transport contracts are excluded from the scope of protection, 
package travel contracts where transport is one part are included.46 Package travel is 
defined as ‘the pre-arranged combination of not fewer than two of the following when 
sold or offered for sale at an inclusive price and when the service covers a period of 
more than twenty-four hours or includes overnight accommodation: (a) transport; (b) 
accommodation; (c) other tourist services not ancillary to transport or accommodation 
and accounting for a significant proportion of the package’.47 The main reason to 
include package travel in the protective conflicts rules is because the consumer 
concludes a single transaction which combines different tour services. The exclusion 
of transport contracts and certain services contracts for choice of law would make 
each unit in the transaction subject to a different jurisdiction and choice of law rules, 
causing uncertainty and extra cost.48 Online package travel experiences ‘high double 
                                                 
42  E.g. Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road of 1956; 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal 
Convention) of 1999.  
43 Art. 13, Jenard Report; Part 1, Schlosser Report. 
44 E.g. Case C-204/08 Rehder v Air Baltic [2009] ECR I-6073. The case concerns the application of the 
Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 Establishing Common Rules on Compensation and Assistance to 
Passengers in the Event of Denied Boarding and of Cancellation or Long Delay of Flights, and 
Repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, [2004] OJ L46/1. 
45 Art. 6(4)(a). This type of contract, however, is still protected in terms of jurisdiction. 
46 Art. 15(3) Brussels I Regulation; art. 6(4)(b), Rome I Regulation; Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-
144/09 Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Heller [2010] ECR I-
12527. 
47 Directive 90/314/EEC on package travel, package holidays and package tours, [1990] OJ L158/59, 
art. 2(1). 
48 Pocar, F. ‘Explanatory report on the Lugano Convention 2007’ (‘Pocar Report 2007’), [2009] OJ 
C319/21, para 84. 
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digit growth, fuelled by dynamic packaging’.49 E-commerce is particularly convenient 
for dynamic packaging, that is, consumers could build their own package by selecting 
flights, accommodation, car rental, airport parking, show tickets, and so on. It is, 
however, uncertain whether dynamic packaging is covered in the definition of 
package travel in the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations. While the consumer has 
selected and booked more than one travel service with one inclusive price, the 
consumer concludes contracts with individual service suppliers respectively instead of 
one single trader or operator. Dynamic packaging is superior to traditional defined 
packaging in terms of cost, flexibility, and personalisation and it is welcomed by 
consumers. According to the travel agent lastminute.com, online agents predict 
growth of 32 per cent coming from dynamic packaging. 50  It is detrimental to 
consumers if they are deprived of the protection in dynamic packaging. The European 
Commission, thus, published a proposal in 2013, which clearly extends the definition 
of package travel to services which ‘are put together by one trader, including at the 
request or according to the selection of the traveller, before a contract on all services 
is concluded’.51 A ‘package’ also exists when consumers conclude separate contracts 
with each service provider if the services are ‘purchased from a single point of sale 
within the same booking process’, ‘offered or charged at an inclusive or total price’, 
use the term ‘package’, ‘combined after the conclusion of a contract by which a trader 
entitles the traveller to choose among a selection of different types of travel services’, 
or ‘purchased from separate traders through linked online booking processes where 
the traveller’s name or particulars needs to conclude a booking transaction are 
transferred between the traders at the latest when the booking of the first service is 
confirmed’.52 The proposal has sufficiently taken special online transaction models 
into consideration and could benefit e-travellers. 
 The Rome I Regulation also excludes contracts relating to rights in rem in 
immovable property or tenancies from the scope of protection, except the right to use 
immovable property on a timeshare basis. 53  It also does not cover rights and 
obligations constituting a financial instrument.54  
 
C. Defendant Domiciled or Deemed to be Domiciled in EU 
 
It is necessary to note that protective private international law in consumer contracts 
has territorial limits. As to choice of law, the Rome I Regulation applies to all 
contractual obligations not excluded from its scope, irrespective of the parties’ 
habitual residence and whether the designated applicable law is the law of a non-
Member State. 55  EU jurisdiction rules within the Brussels I Regulation apply to 
disputes where the defendant has his domicile within one of the EU Member States. 
However, in consumer contracts, if a non-EU defendant has a branch, agency or other 
                                                 
49  Davies, P. (2006) ‘Online travel makes further inroads into package arena’, Travel Mole, 26 
September, accessed 15 April 2014 at, 
http://www.travelmole.com/news_feature.php?news_id=1111196&c=setreg&region=2. 
50 Ibid. 
51 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
package travel and assisted travel arrangements, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004, Directive 
2011/83/EU and repealing Council Directive 90/314/EEC, 2013/0246 (COD), COM(2013) 512 final, 
art. 3(2)(a). 
52 Art. 3(2)(b). 
53 Art. 6(4)(c) and Recital 27, Rome I Regulation. 
54 Art. 6(4)(d) and (e). 
55 Art. 2 Rome I Regulation. 
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establishment in one of the Member States, the defendant is deemed to be domiciled 
within that state while a dispute arises out of the operation of the business 
establishment. 56  This provision may bring many e-businesses domiciled in third 
countries within the scheme of the protective jurisdiction if the e-business has an 
‘establishment’ within one of the Member States. It is uncertain as to what can be 
considered as an establishment within electronic commerce.57 The existing CJEU case 
law suggests that a business ‘establishment’ must have the following characteristics: it 
has a fixed permanent appearance, could conduct continuous instead of one-off 
commercial activities, is subject to the direction of the parent, could act in a way that 
binds the parent, and has certain degrees of autonomy.58 Thus an interactive website 
hosted in one of the Member States and accessible permanently in others, could 
facilitate the conclusion of contracts on behalf of parents, bind parents and therefore 
meet all the requirements and be classified as an establishment.59 If the concept is 
broad enough to include any e-agent or e-store that can be accessed in a Member State, 
it could theoretically bring all third country e-companies into the protective 
jurisdiction scheme. As a result, European private international law not only has 
community effects but also has impact on the international dimension.60  
 
D. Expectation of Businesses 
 
The fourth limitation is the most important one. For all contracts not expressly 
excluded from the Brussels I and Rome I Regulations, protective private international 
law applies where the businesses could reasonably expect to be subject to the 
jurisdiction and choice of law of the consumer’s home.61 In other words, protective 
private international law does not apply blindly to all consumer contracts included in 
the protective scheme. It can only apply if the business has targeted or marketed in the 
consumer’s home, which makes jurisdiction and applicable law of this country 
predictable. This requirement is designed to achieve commercial security. It is 
unreasonable to provide consumer unlimited protection even if it is the consumer who 
approaches the business in the latter’s home to complete a transaction, though the 
latter has never intended to be subject to any foreign judicial systems. 
 Determining business expectations, however, is not easy, particularly in e-
commerce. Different tests are proposed. The subjective approach proposes that the 
business must have a true intention to target the consumer’s home.62 This suggestion 
is criticized for being unrealistic. On the one hand, it is hard to assess whether a 
business has ‘true’ intention especially when it conducts online trading; on the other 
hand, if a business has repeated transactions with consumers resident in a particular 
country, it is unfair to release the business from consumer protection rules simply 
                                                 
56 Art. 15(2) Brussels I Regulation. 
57 Reed, C. (2001), ‘Managing regulatory jurisdiction’ 38 Houston Law Review 1003; Oren, J. (2001), 
‘Electronic agents and the notion of establishment’ 9 International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 249, s. 4.1.3; Tang, supra n. 5, pp. 66–73. 
58 Reed, C. (2004), Internet Law: Text and Materials 2nd edn., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, p. 201, para. 10.81. 
59 Cf. ibid, p. 201; Fawcett, Harris, and Bridge, supra n. 5, para. 10.83. 
60 Economic and Social Committee Opinion, para. 4.2.2. 
61 The only exceptions are credit sale contracts. In terms of jurisdiction, all consumers are protected in 
credit sale contracts, irrespective of the business’s expectation. Art. 15(1)(a) and (b) Brussels I 
Regulation. 
62 Foss and Bygrave, supra n. 32, 118; cf. Oren, supra, n. 57, 89. 
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because the ‘intention to target’ cannot be proved.63 The objective approach is thus 
more realistic, that is, whether the online conduct of the business demonstrates that it 
has targeted a particular country as a matter of fact. The ‘targeting’ test is discussed in 
detail in the next section. 
 
IV. ‘TARGETING’ CONSUMERS THROUGH THE INTERNET 
 
A. From Accessibility to Interactivity 
 
Ever since the birth of the new arrangement in the Brussels I Regulation, the adoption 
of the expression of ‘direct to’ has been questioned and criticized. The European 
Economic and Social Committee, for example, stated its opinion that the expression 
‘is not clear enough to foster a climate of trust between the parties’.64  This was 
probably because the European Commission once had given a very generous 
interpretation to ‘direct to’. Recital 13 of the Commission Proposal 1999 states that 
‘whereas, in particular, electronic commerce in goods or services by a means 
accessible in another Member State constitutes an activity directed to that State’.65 
The accessibility approach has also been adopted, at least partially, in domestic courts 
of some Member States. For example, a German court held that a business had 
directed its business at Germany by holding a website in German language accessible 
in Germany.66 
 The accessibility approach has been criticized by most Internet lawyers and 
has been abandoned by the Commission. In 2000, the European Parliament proposed 
that:67 
‘The concept of activities pursued or directed towards a Member State is 
designed to make clear that point (3) [Article 15.1(c)] applies to consumer 
contracts concluded via an interactive website accessible in the State of the 
consumer’s domicile. The fact that a consumer simply had knowledge of a 
service or possibility of buying goods via a passive website accessible in his 
country of domicile will not trigger the protective jurisdiction.’ 
 
This interpretation first of all rejected the pure ‘accessibility’ approach and proposed a 
new ‘activity’ test. This test suggests that only if an ‘interactive’ website is accessible 
in the consumer’s home and a contract is entered into via the website, has the business 
targeted the consumer’s home. A purely ‘passive’ website does not trigger the 
potential protective jurisdiction. This approach is similar to the contribution made in 
the USA. In the US case Zippo Manufacturing Co v Zippo Dot Com,68 the US District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania ruled that in order to establish 
jurisdiction over a website the court should consider the activity of the website. If the 
website is active, which includes ‘knowing and repeated transmission of computer 
files’, taking jurisdiction is proper; if the website is passive, ‘where a defendant has 
simply posted information on an Internet website which is accessible to users in 
                                                 
63 Oren, supra n. 57, 89. 
64 Economic and Social Committee Opinion, para 4.2.4. 
65 Commission Proposal, recital 13. It shows that the Commission does not make a clear clarification 
between ‘accessibility’ and ‘activity’ of a website. 
66 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, supra n. 40, 1450146; VznGr Den Haag, NIPR 2005, 168. 
67 European Parliament, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Presented by the Commission)’, 
COM (1999) 348 final 99/0154 (CNS). 
68 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D.Pa. 1997). 
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foreign jurisdictions’, taking jurisdiction is improper; if the website is in the middle, 
that is, the interactive website, ‘where a user can exchange information with the host 
computer’, taking jurisdiction depends on ‘the level of interactivity and commercial 
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the website’. 69  There is a 
fundamental difference between the Zippo case and the protective jurisdiction in the 
Brussels I Regulation. The Zippo case concerns jurisdiction in trade mark 
infringement and tort cases, not contracts or consumer protection cases.70 However, 
there is also similarity that allows European law-makers to consider the effect of the 
sliding-scale test. The Zippo case provides a test to determine whether the defendant 
has ‘purposefully availed’ himself of the jurisdiction of a country. Where a defendant 
purposefully avails himself of the control of a country at distance through the Internet, 
the defendant generally is required to ‘target’ that country. This ‘target’ may not be 
subjective, but objective, reflected by activities, for example, how frequent the e-
business has transactions with the residents of the particular country and how easily 
and effectively the e-business enables and solicits the consumers of this country to 
enter into transactions. Article 15(1)(c), on the other hand, aims to provide certainty to 
businesses and will only subject them to the consumer’s domicile if they have 
willingly targeted that country. Although the US and EU jurisdiction rules are formed 
on different philosophy and legal bases, they share similarity in terms of looking for a 
basis to subject a distant company to jurisdiction. Both aim to protect the defendant 
from unfair surprises and both require activities to show that the defendant could 
reasonably expect to be subject to the jurisdiction of a country. 
 The European Parliament’s proposal clearly follows the same line as the US 
approach, by separating commercial websites into ‘interactive’ and ‘passive’.71 It is 
necessary to note that the terminology in the Parliament proposal is slightly different 
from that of the USA. In Zippo, websites are classified into ‘active’, ‘interactive’ and 
‘passive’. In the Parliament’s proposal, websites are classified into ‘interactive’ and 
‘passive’. The ‘interactive’ website in the proposal refers to a website which could 
exchange information with consumers and facilitate the conclusion of contracts and, 
sometimes, their performance.72 According to the Parliament, an interactive website 
satisfies the ‘targeting’ test while a passive website does not. 
 Many commentators have criticized the Zippo decision by pointing out the 
difficulty of classifying websites into different categories. It is true that drawing a 
clear line between active, interactive and passive websites is tough.73 Furthermore, it 
is even tougher to further classify ‘interactive’ websites into pro-active and pro-
passive sites. 74  The Parliament seems to have simplified the task by classifying 
websites into two larger categories. However, it does not truly bring certainty to 
practice. It is still uncertain where exactly the line should be drawn. The passive 
website can be defined very narrowly where it does no more than advertise products 
and services, only offering consumers knowledge of the products sold and services 
                                                 
69 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124. 
70 Hill, supra n. 5, pp. 137–8; Tang, supra n. 5, pp. 113–14. 
71 Parliament proposal.  
72 For example, the website incorporated an online payment system, which allows the consumer to pay 
online by using a credit card, or a website allows the download of software or other digital products 
after receiving payment from consumers.  
73 Winfield Collection v McCauley 105 F Supp 2d 746, 750 (ED Mich 2000); Tang, supra n. 5, pp. 112–
13; M. Geist (2001), ‘Is there a there there? Towards greater certainty for internet jurisdiction’ 16 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1345, 1354; Berman, P. (2002), ‘The globalisation of jurisdiction’ 
151 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 311, 410.  
74 Tang, supra n. 5, p. 113. 
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provided. A passive website may also provide consumer contact information for the 
business or provide information on how to place an order. This website may still be 
passive in that there is no direct exchange of communication between the consumer 
and the business via the website. This site, however, may still be directed to the 
consumer’s domicile, and if the consumer does enter into contract with the company 
at distance by following the information provided online, it is hard to argue that the 
business does not direct its commercial activities to the consumer’s home. However, it 
is arguable that the protective jurisdiction is not triggered by the website, but by the 
later activities of the business in receiving the consumer’s order placed at distance. 
 In any case, the distinction between ‘interactive’ and ‘passive’ websites is not 
an appropriate approach in that the activity of the website does not necessarily imply 
the purpose and expectation of the business. A business may establish an interactive 
website which is accessible in all Member States but is only intended to conduct 
domestic transactions. 75  A business may not be able to properly control the 
accessibility of a passive website as well as an interactive website. The question is 
whether a business is obliged to take positive steps to prevent a contract from being 
concluded with consumers domiciled in a market that the business does not want to 
target. The answer is positive. A business is not allowed to enjoy the benefit received 
from a contract and to escape protective jurisdiction by claiming it could not control 
the website well. A number of instruments can be adopted to prevent unwanted 
contracts, including making a clear declaration online, rejecting delivery to countries 
out of its targeted markets, or blocking access or placing of orders by consumers 
located in certain countries by testing the IP address.76 It is arguable that technology 
was not well developed a decade ago, which made efficient ring-fencing difficult. 
However, ring-fencing is generally effective now. Many multinational companies 
invite consumers to select their habitual residence/domicile and then bring the 
consumers to the website designed particularly for their country. Some small and 
medium-sized companies do not have sufficient financial power to maintain more 
than one website targeting different countries. They will usually include a declaration 
in their website, requiring consumers to provide information about their delivery 
address, and refuse delivery to unwanted markets. 
 These methods combined, are in most cases effective in protecting the 
reasonable expectations of business. In other words, the Internet is no longer 
completely out of control. The majority of consumer-oriented e-selling relates to 
physical delivery of goods. A business could certainly control the destination of 
delivery. The only problem is the possibility of the delivery address differing from the 
consumer’s home address. Article 15(1)(c) does not include a provision to include or 
exclude mobile consumers from its scope. In other words, if the website is directed to 
the consumer’s home and the contract is within the framework of the website, the 
business is subject to the consumer’s home jurisdiction, regardless of where the 
contract is concluded. 
 
B. Comprehensive Approach 
 
                                                 
75 See Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, supra n. 40, 146. 
76 Oren, supra, n. 57, 69; Foss and Bygrave, supra, n. 32, n. 74. 
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Realising the uncertainty and concerns about Article 15(1)(c) of the Brussels I 
Regulation, the Council and the Commission have published a joint statement which 
says that:77 
‘...for Article 15(1)(c) to be applicable it is not sufficient for an undertaking to 
target its activities at the Member State of the consumer’s residence, or at a 
number of Member States including that Member State; a contract must also be 
concluded within the framework of its activities. This provision relates to a 
number of marketing methods, including contracts concluded at a distance 
through the Internet. 
 In this context, the Council and the Commission stress that the mere fact that 
an Internet site is accessible is not sufficient for Article 15 to be applicable, 
although a factor will be that this Internet site solicits the conclusion of distance 
contracts and that a contract has actually been concluded at a distance, by 
whatever means. In this respect, the language or currency which a website uses 
does not constitute a relevant factor.’ 
 
The statement shows at least five points. First, the pure accessibility test is abandoned. 
E-businesses should not worry that simply by maintaining a website they will 
automatically be subject to the jurisdiction and applicable law of other Member States. 
Second, the website must solicit distant consumers to enter into the contract. How can 
it be decided if a website has solicited consumers into transactions? For a website to 
‘solicit’ a consumer into a contract, some conditions must be fulfilled. First of all, the 
consumer must know the existence of the website and must have viewed the website 
before entering into the contract.78 If a consumer did not know a website existed or 
did not browse the website but has acquired information about the products offline, 
even if the business has a website, the consumer was not solicited into the contract by 
the website. In Re the Website of a Czech Discotheque,79 for example, an Austrian 
consumer entered into a contract without knowing of the existence of the defendant’s 
website accessible in Austria. The consumer was clearly not solicited into the contract 
by the website. Furthermore, the browsing of the website must be the reason why the 
consumer entered into a contract, or travelled abroad to enter into a contract. To 
decide whether the website is a reason that the consumer enters into a contract, a 
variety of facts should be taken into account. The Council and the Commission say in 
the Joint Statement that the country-specific indicia are not relevant factors to make 
the protective jurisdiction rules apply.80 It is suggested that the real meaning is that 
country-specific indicia should not be the ‘sole’ factors in deciding whether a website 
has targeted another country.81 These indicia, such as the language and currency, 
nevertheless, are certainly relevant factors that a court could take into account to 
decide whether a website did solicit consumers into transactions. If a consumer could 
not understand the language, for example, it is a strong reason to demonstrate that the 
website does not solicit the consumer into the contract. In Re the Website of a Czech 
Discotheque,82 the website in dispute used Czech which is not understood by the 
                                                 
77  The Council and the Commission, ‘Joint Statement on Articles 15 and 73’ (‘joint statement’) 
accessed 15 April 2014 at http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/homepage/homepage_ec_en_declaration.pdf.. 
78 Re the Website of a Czech Discotheque, Case 2 Ob 256/08y, [2010] I.L.Pr. 5. 
79 Case 2 Ob 256/08y, [2010] I.L.Pr. 5. 
80 Joint Statement, supra n. 77, n. 55. the language or currency which a website uses does not constitute 
a relevant factor. 
81 See Pammer v Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Heller, paras 92–94. 
82 Case 2 Ob 256/08y, [2010] I.L.Pr. 5. 
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majority of Austrian residents. This factor was accepted by the Austrian court to show 
that the website did not target Austrian consumers. In Pammer v Reederei Karl 
Schluter GmbH and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Heller, the CJEU suggests that the 
following matters are relevant, including the international nature of business activities, 
mention of consumers from other Member States going to the trader’s place, use of 
language or currency, possibility of making and confirming reservations or order in a 
foreign language, mention of a telephone number with an international code, outlay of 
expenditure on an Internet referencing service, use of a top-level domain, and display 
of an international clientele composed of consumers domiciled in other Member 
States.83 
 Third, it does not matter whether the e-business has ‘subjectively’ targeted the 
consumer’s domicile.84 As far as a website has, as a matter of fact, facilitated the sale, 
the business is subject to the protective jurisdiction and choice of law rule. The 
language and currency, for example, sometimes could show that the e-business has 
the intention of marketing in a particular country. If the country-specific indicia are 
very special, they may have stronger weight when being used in a positive manner, to 
show a business ‘wants’ to target a country. They would be given less weight if one 
wants to rely on them to prove a business ‘does not’ want to target a country. For 
example, a website uses pounds as an acceptable currency to pay for the purchases. 
This is a strong indication that the e-company wishes to target the UK. However, the 
Joint Statement now shows that this factor is no longer important. One should not 
consider what a business wishes to do, but consider what the real life effect of a 
website is. No matter what language and currency are used, only if the consumer was 
attracted into the transactions could the protective conflicts rules apply. For the same 
reason, if the business states in the website that it ‘does not wish’ to target particular 
countries, while the real practice does not correspond with the statement, or at least no 
positive act has been done to prevent unwanted transactions, it still has objectively 
‘solicited’ consumers into contracts.85 It, however, needs to be noted that the Joint 
Statement is only a recommendation and has no binding effect. 86  The CJEU in 
Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof continued to consider whether the business is 
‘envisaging doing business with consumers domiciled in one or more Member 
States’.87 Certainly, if there is sufficient evidence to prove such intention, there is no 
reason to subject business to the protective rules. The question is whether proving 
intention is necessary. The Joint Statement seems to have simplified the burden of 
proof. 
 Fourth, the concept of ‘soliciting’ does not concern the nature of a website, 
that is, whether it is active or passive.88 The real effect of a website does not depend 
on whether it is active or not. If a website is completely passive, that is, it provides 
advertisements only, it could still solicit a consumer into a contract. The only 
difficulty is that the contract cannot easily be concluded online. This, however, does 
not matter if a contract is eventually concluded within the framework of the website. 
On the other hand, whether a website is interactive or active, it cannot subject an e-
                                                 
83 Paras 92–94. 
84 Bogdan, M. (2012), ‘Defamation on the internet, forum delicti and the E-Commerce Directive’, in 
Bonomi, A. and G. Romano, Yearbook of Private International Law 2012, Munich: Sellier European 
Law p. 486. 
85 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, supra n. 40, 147, citing German case, 03/30/2006, JZ 2006, 1187. 
86 Bogdan, M. (2011), ‘Website accessibility as basis for jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation’ 5 
Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology 1, 7. 
87 Para. 76. 
88 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, supra n. 40, 146. 
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business to protective conflicts law if the website does not have a real effect on the 
consumer’s decision to buy.89 
 Fifth, it does not matter whether the contract was entered into online, through 
the website, or offline. If a contract is concluded within the framework of the 
activities, the targeting test is fulfilled. 
 The comprehensive approach requires one to consider not the nature of a 
website, or the subjective intention of the business, but the effect of the website, that 
is, whether it has solicited a consumer into a contract within the framework of the 
activities. Compared to previous approaches proposed either by legislators or by 
academic writers, the comprehensive approach has three advantages. It is flexible in 
that it does not impose rigid rules and test standards that must be blindly applied to 
each individual case. Flexibility is particularly important in e-commerce, because 
each website presents different characteristics and consumers enter into contracts 
under different circumstances. Rigid rules designed for pre-designated circumstances 
would inevitably lead to unfairness in cases that include unexpected situations. 
Second, it does not distinguish websites as interactive or passive, nor distinguish 
consumers as mobile or static.90 As far as consumers are solicited into transactions, 
even if consumers do not take all necessary steps within their domicile, or the website 
is passive only, consumers are still eligible for protection. It avoids difficult 
classification issues in e-commerce. Third, it applies to all types of transactions 
involving the use of a website. It applies not only to Internet trading via the website 
maintained and controlled directly by the e-business, but also via the use of a third-
party platform, such as eBay or Amazon. 91  It is thus improper to rely on the 
characteristics of the website to determine whether the e-business concerned has 
targeted the consumer’s domicile, as all e-businesses will use the same platform to 
sell. E-businesses will only be able to ring-fence their market by two means: one is to 
provide a clear statement that it will only trade with consumers in particular countries; 
another is to control its market at the delivery stage. If the company does not ‘ring-
fence’ and the consumer enters into the contract, protective conflicts rules should 
apply because the consumer is solicited into the contract by the Internet site. 
 
V. PARTY AUTONOMY IN E-CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
 
Having said that the effect of party autonomy is limited in e-consumer contracts under 
European private international law, however, is not to say that it is completely 
excluded. In terms of jurisdiction, the parties in a consumer contract are still allowed 
to choose the competent court if they have made the choice after disputes have arisen, 
if the choice has expanded instead of limited the consumer’s option, and if they have 
chosen their common domiciles at the time of contracting.92 In terms of choice of law, 
the parties are allowed to choose the governing law which will provide the higher 
standard of protection provided by mandatory rules of the consumer’s habitual 
residence. 93  Furthermore, there are some special contracts which are consumer 
                                                 
89 The nature of websites is irrelevant in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof. 
90  Previous conditions in art. 13 of the Brussels Convention and art. 5 of the Rome Convention 
distinguish consumer into mobile and static and do not protect mobile consumers.  
91 eBay, www.ebay.com; Amazon, www.amazon.com. They are two famous multinational e-commerce 
companies providing virtual marketplace, online auctions and shopping opportunities for consumers 
and small e-sellers. 
92 Art. 17 Brussels I Regulation. 
93  Art. 6(2) Rome I Regulation: ‘Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the parties may choose the law 
applicable to a contract which fulfils the requirements of paragraph 1, in accordance with Article 3. 
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contracts in nature, but which are excluded from the scope of protection for other 
reasons.94 Party autonomy is fully applicable in these contracts. 
 Although the doctrine of party autonomy is generally intact from the challenge 
of e-commerce, the Internet has imposed practical and technical problems which need 
to the clarified. Jurisdiction or choice of law agreements in e-consumer contracts are 
usually concluded in the form of click-wrap contracts. During the process of 
concluding the contract, the terms and conditions will be displayed and consumers are 
required to click ‘I agree’ or ‘I accept’ in order to submit the order. Are these click-
wrap agreements valid under European private international law? 
 A uniform choice of law rule is provided to decide formal validity of a choice 
of law agreement in consumer contracts, which will be the law of the consumer’s 
habitual residence.95 This section will only consider formal validity requirements in 
the Brussels I Regulation. Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation says that a 
jurisdiction agreement is formally valid if it is concluded in writing or evidenced in 
writing, if it complies with the common practice between the parties and if it complies 
with the usage and customs in the trade. In e-consumer contracts, the first challenge 
might be whether a jurisdiction agreement is concluded ‘in writing’. Article 23(2) 
clarifies that ‘in writing’ includes ‘(a)ny communication by electronic means which 
provides a durable record of the agreement’. A click-wrap agreement, as far as it can 
be recorded in a durable form, is intact in art. 23. Furthermore, the European 
Commission has specifically confirmed that the formal requirement does not intend to 
‘invalidate a choice-of-forum clause concluded in a form that is not written on paper 
but accessible on screen’.96 However, what if the consumer claims that he did not 
have a chance to read or he did not notice the existence of the jurisdiction agreement 
in the terms and conditions? The CJEU has, in past case law, demonstrated the policy 
of requiring the jurisdiction clause to be written in a manner that could provide 
sufficient notice to the other party.97 A term printed on the reverse side of a contract 
without any reference on the face was held invalid.98 As a result, in e-commerce, if 
the consumer is not well directed to the jurisdiction agreement, even if the consumer 
has clicked to accept, this agreement is invalid as to form. This could be the case if 
the jurisdiction clause is included in the terms and conditions, which are not displayed 
on the webpage, the link to which is not provided, or there is no reference directing 
consumers’ attention to the terms and conditions. It is uncertain whether a website 
must be able to ‘force’ consumers to read through before they could conclude click 
wrap contracts. For example, some websites are equipped with software that displays 
part of the terms and conditions within a box with a rolling bar. The click-button ‘I 
accept’ is inactivated. Only after the user draws the bar to the bottom which shows 
that the user has read through the terms, is the ‘I accept’ link activated and the 
consumer can proceed to the next stage to conclude the contract. Some websites adopt 
a fixed time system. The ‘I accept’ button is inactivated until the terms and conditions 
                                                                                                                                            
Such a choice may not, however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded 
to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the 
absence of choice, would have been applicable on the basis of paragraph 1.’ 
94 Such as transport contracts (art. 15(3) Brussels I Regulation; art. 6(4)(b) Rome I Regulation), some 
services contracts (art. 6(4)(a) Rome I Regulation), and contracts on financial instruments (art. 6(4)(c) 
and (d) Rome I Regulation). 
95 Art. 11(4) Rome I Regulation. 
96 Commission Proposal 1999, Art 23. 
97  Case 24/76 Estasis Salotti di Colzani Aimo e Gianmario Colzani v RUWA Polstereimaschinen 
GmbH [1976] ECR 1831. 
98 Ibid. 
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are displayed for 60 seconds on the webpage. Both are all that e-businesses could do 
to maximise the chances of consumers to read the terms and conditions and to provide 
real consent. These devices certainly will make the jurisdiction agreement valid. 
However, they are not mandatory. Even if these instruments are used, the majority of 
consumers still do not read through these terms. As far as the jurisdiction clause is 
clearly displayed and consumers are adequately noticed of its existence, the clause 
should be held valid as to form.99 
 It is a common practice for an e-business to establish a website that requires 
consumers to register. When the consumer first uses the website to buy, he is required 
to go through the full process, by providing his name and address and by being 
required to read and accept the terms and conditions, which normally include a 
jurisdiction agreement. If the consumer purchases from the website for the second 
time, he is a returning consumer and can conclude contracts fairly quickly, by simply 
signing in. He is no longer required to read and agree upon the terms and conditions. 
The question is whether the jurisdiction agreement concluded in the first transaction 
still binds the consumer. This raises two questions. First, is the jurisdiction agreement 
concluded in the previous transaction validly incorporated into the current 
transactions? It depends on what has been agreed between the parties. If the terms and 
conditions displayed at the time of registration clearly provide that they should apply 
to all subsequent transactions and consumers are fully notified, they may be 
incorporated in the current sale. If no such agreements exist and there is no notice in 
current transactions to refer to the general terms concluded before, they are not 
incorporated in the current contract. Second, if the jurisdiction agreement is not 
incorporated into the current contract, would it constitute ‘common practice’ between 
the parties? It is true that the same companies have entered into more than one 
agreement on usually similar transactions; however, using common practice in 
consumer contracts is inappropriate, because the common practice principle is based 
on implied consent between sophisticated business parties. They are experienced and 
qualified to project commercial risks and bound by their common practice. This 
principle clearly cannot work properly for consumer contracts to the disadvantage of 
consumers. 
 
VI. ADR, ODR AND COLLECTIVE REDRESS 
 
Although protective jurisdiction and choice of law rules have generated several 
debates, it has been recognized by more and more researchers and practitioners that 
these rules are not used frequently in practice.100 The main reason is that consumer 
contracts are usually low-value contracts which make litigation, especially cross-
border litigation, irrational. The small value nature is even so in e-commerce. Without 
the opportunity to investigate the product in advance, a consumer would usually not 
enter into large value contracts online. It appears that the protective jurisdiction and 
choice of law rules have much weaker real life impact than expected and they cannot 
really improve consumers’ access to justice or encourage consumers to buy online. 
 
                                                 
99 Anyway, even if technical devices are adopted, they cannot guarantee that consumers definitely read 
it. In practice, most consumers will simply drag down the bar and proceed to buy, or wait for the 
‘submit’ button to be activated without actually reading or agreeing on the jurisdiction agreement. 
100 Schlosser states that ‘(a)bundant literature exists which is out of proportion to the practical impact of 
Section 4’. See Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser, supra n. 40, 144. 
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In order to overcome the weakness in consumer litigation, the European Commission 
is also working to develop a multiple dispute resolution scheme for cross-border 
consumer disputes. Protective private international law continues to play an important 
part in the multi-dispute resolution scheme, including ADR, ODR and collective 
redress. If a consumer agrees to resolve disputes out of court, either by traditional 
ADR or ODR, the protective jurisdiction rule is no longer relevant because the ADR 
or ODR entity is only competent to attend a dispute when both parties agree to submit 
to it. If a consumer does not wish to submit to a foreign ADR entity, the business will 
not unilaterally generate the procedure. There is no need to protect consumers in 
terms of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the ADR Directive also provides that ‘with regard 
to disputes arising from cross-border sales or service contracts, consumers can obtain 
assistance to access the ADR entity operating in another Member State which is 
competent to deal with their cross-border dispute’. 101  This further reduces the 
jurisdiction difficulty. Finally, jurisdiction problems will be extinguished if ODR is 
used, which enables the parties to resolve their disputes online. The Regulation on 
ODR requires Member States to establish an ODR platform, which is ‘an interactive 
website which can be accessed electronically and free of charge in all the official 
languages of the institutions of the Union’.102  The dispute will be processed and 
resolved online and neither party is required to be physically present in another 
country. Jurisdiction concerns will not arise at all in ODR. Protective choice of law, 
on the other hand, is still relevant. Pursuant to the ADR Directive, the solution 
imposed by the ADR entity should not deprive consumers of protection afforded by 
the mandatory rules of the consumer’s habitual residence if the dispute falls within the 
scope of art. 6(1) and 6(2) of the Rome I Regulation.103 The same standard applies to 
ODR.104 This is particularly important especially where an ADR or ODR solution is 
going to be binding on both parties. Consumers will only be confident in cooperating 
if there are rules to guarantee that they will receive at least no substantively lower 
protection in ADR or ODR. 
 It is also necessary to note that out-of-court dispute resolution, especially ODR, 
may not be able to resolve all consumer disputes. For example, the very nature of 
ODR determines that it may not be able to resolve complicated disputes. Furthermore, 
effective and low-cost judicial redress should always be there to assist consumers. As 
a result, the European Commission has published a Recommendation to encourage 
Member States to adopt collective redress mechanisms to enable multiple consumers 
to combine their disputes against one defendant in one action. The Recommendation 
proposes that the national mechanism should be an opt-in scheme 105  and a 
representative collective action can only be led by a qualified entity.106 However, a 
Member State cannot refuse to hear a cross-border collective redress based on the 
standing and admissibility of the claimant group or the representative entity domiciled 
                                                 
101 Directive 2013/11/EU on Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer Disputes and Amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, [2013] OJ L165/63, art. 14(1). 
102 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC, art. 5(2). 
103 ADR Directive, art. 11(1)(b) and (c), and recital 44. 
104 Regulation on ODR, art. 2. 
105  The judgment will not bind particular consumers unless they expressly choose to opt-in. An 
opposite scheme is called ‘opt-out’, where a collective action judgment will bind all potential 
consumers unless they choose to opt-out. See the Recommendation, section V. 
106 Arts 4–7. 
 19 
in another Member State.107 It suggests that the Commission Regulation allows pan-
European collective action in principle. 
 Collective redress could be useful in protecting consumers and businesses in 
e-commerce. One the one hand, while a business trades online, it usually establishes 
one website with a few mirror sites targeting consumers in different markets of its 
choice. Similar commercial practice in mass markets will lead to similar claims from 
more than one consumer. Resolving the similar claims separately, either in court or in 
ADR/ODR, is not considered economic. The best way is to enable these similar 
claims to be resolved together in one procedure. This redress method could reduce 
litigation costs to each consumer, and could also help businesses to resolve all 
complaints in one ruling instead of being subjected to multiple claims in the future. 
 The European Commission has also stated that the existing jurisdiction and 
choice of law rules should apply to collective redress. This raises questions as to how 
the current European private international law could fit into the special nature of 
collective redress. First, the protective jurisdiction could not be used in consumer 
representative action, because the action is brought by the representative entity against 
the business instead of by each individual consumer against the defendant. General 
jurisdiction rules in art. 5(1), as a result, will apply. Article 5(1) says that jurisdiction 
in relation to a contract should be the place where the goods are delivered or services 
provided. In e-commerce, where goods, such as digital products, are delivered online, 
or services are provided online, it is questionable as to where the Member State where 
goods are delivered or services provided is.108 The possible suggestions include the 
place of uploading, the place of the seller’s server where the products are hosted, and 
the place of downloading.109 Until now, there is no clear answer to this question. In 
collective actions where digital products are downloaded by consumers domiciled in 
more than one Member State, the first option, that is, the place where goods are 
uploaded, may be more realistic. It points to one single jurisdiction in all consumer 
contracts. If the third option is adopted it could lead to multiple competent 
jurisdictions and may lead to the split of collective redress.110 The second option 
points to the country that may have factitious connections with both the disputes and 
the parties and should be abandoned. 
 Second, applying the protective choice of law rules in collective redress may 
lead to the position where consumers with their habitual residence in different 
Member States are entitled to the protection of mandatory rules of different Member 
States. It will lead to the application of different substantive law to different groups of 
consumers in one collective action, which is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
purpose of collective action, which is to facilitate convenient resolution of disputes 
with similar rights and obligations. Different substantive law imposes different rights 
and obligations which may prevent collective actions from being effectively brought 
in the circumstances. The current European jurisdiction and choice of law rules need 
reform in order to be compatible with future development of collective redress. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
                                                 
107 Arts 17–18. 
108 Fawcett, Harris and Bridge, supra n. 5, paras 3.177–199. 
109 Fawcett, Harris and Bridge, supra n. 5, paras 10.60–75, and 10.105. 
110 For more discussion, see Tang, Z.S. (2011), ‘Consumer collective redress in European private 
international law’, 7 Journal of Private International Law 101 ff. 
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It is concluded that although the Internet has brought challenges to the European 
jurisdiction and choice of law rules in consumer contracts, the challenges are not 
fundamental. The Internet challenge has been considered seriously by the legislators 
and guidance has been provided to help courts in the Member States in their practice. 
The current European conflict of laws generally works effectively in e-consumer 
contracts. At the least, no consumers or businesses have claimed that they are 
prevented from entering into e-commerce because of the worry about where to sue or 
be sued or which substantive law applies. However, in order to fully improve 
consumers’ access to justice and to facilitate e-commerce, alternative dispute 
resolution methods and collective action should be adopted and developed. European 
private international law in consumer contracts should be reformed to accommodate 
the future development of these new redress methods. 
